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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a
National Banking Association,
and 4447 ASSOCIATES, a Utah
general partnership,
No. 970644-CA
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Argument Priority 15
v.
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL,
a National corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court
for Salt Lake County, Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Judge

JURISDICTION
This appeal is from findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment of the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered July 1, 1997 against First
Security Financial ("Bank") and in favor of 4447 Associates ("4447"). The Bank filed this
appeal in the Utah Supreme Court (No. 970382), which had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (1992). On November 5, 1997, the Utah Supreme Court poured
1

over this appeal to this Court for disposition (No. 970644-CA). This Court of Appeals thus
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Is the Bank precluded from asserting that Section 70A-9-318(2) should apply

where the trial court twice found, assuming arguendo that the statute applied, that the Bank
presented insufficient evidence to establish any defense under the statute and the Bank failed
to appeal those findings. Entry of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness.1 This
issue is preserved at R. 1783-1868,1896-1981. When challenging findings of fact entered by
the trial court after trial on remand, an appellant must marshal all evidence supporting the
finding in order to demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, is insufficient to support the finding.2 This issue is preserved at R.2155-71.
2.

Does this Court's prior, final decision applying Section 70A-9-318(l) to this

case and rejecting application of Section 70A-9-318(3) preclude the Bank from attempting
to assert defenses under Section 70A-9-318(3) on remand regardles of the Utah Supreme
Court's decision interpreting Section 70A-9-318(3) prior to entry of judgment by the trial

x

Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. App.l993)(czYmg Bountiful
v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989).
2

Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2d 487, 489 (Utah Ct. App.l993))(c/Ymg
Grayson Roper Ltd, v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989).
2

court. The trial court's legal rulings are reviewed for correctness.3 This issue is preserved
at R. 1783-1868,1896-1981, 2155-71.
3.

Whether the trial court correctly awarded 4447 attorney fees and costs as the

prevailing party under the Asset Purchase Agreement where appellant failed to make
payments required by the Asset Purchase Agreement. This Court reviews the trial court's
legal rulings for correctness.4 This issue is preserved at R.1908-12.
The Bank appeals questions of law. The Bank has failed to challenge factual findings
made by the trial court. Therefore, those factual findings are not before this Court.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
This case was decided by the trial court sitting without a jury. On summary judgment,
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is determinative. See Addendum A. As to questions
regarding the assignment, Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9-318 is determinative. See
Addendum B.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
The Complaint filed in this case on March 3, 1987, alleging that through a settlement
agreement the Bank and Capitol Thrift & Loan ("Capitol") wrongfully attempted to
extinguish the Bank's obligations to Capitol. By assignment, Zions became entitled to

'Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah 1998).
"Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah 1998).
3

receive the payments and the Bank received notice of the assignment. However, the Bank
failed to obtain permission from or give notice to 4447 regarding the settlement agreement
which purported to extinguish the Bank's obligation. 4447 asked the trial court to order the
Bank to pay the amount owing including attorney fees and costs. (R. 6-7.) The Bank
answered the Complaint, denied liability saying it had not received notice of the assignment.
(R. 42-46.)
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
On May 24, 1990, the trial court granted the Bank's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and determined that the principal amount owed to Capitol under the Purchase
Agreements should be adjusted downward by $1,000,000. (R. 398)
Following a bench trial on January 6-7, 1992, the trial court issued a Memorandum
Decision on January 30, 1992, (R. 702-11), and a judgment on November 3, 1992, (R. 78384), in the Bank's favor. This Court reversed the trial court on January 6, 1995 and
remanded the case for entry of "an appropriate judgment" in favor of 4447. 889 P.2d 467,
476 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The Bank unsuccessfully petitioned for certiorari. (R. 1687.)
On remand, the trial court granted 4447fs motion for partial summary judgment and
the Bank filed several motions assailing the judgment. After denying the Bank's remaining
defenses, the trial court entered judgment in favor of 4447 and the Bank filed this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are in the record from the trial court:
THE PARTIES AND THE PURCHASE AGREEMENTS
4

1.

The Bank purchased certain assets of Capitol under the terms of an asset

purchase agreement (the "Asset Purchase Agreement"). (R. 679.)
2.

The Asset Purchase Agreement required the Bank to pay Capitol $ 1,077,777.42

on December 13, 1985. (R. 679.) The Asset Purchase Agreement also required quarterly
interest payments to Capitol of $25,194.44. Id.
3.

Paragraph 2 of the Asset Purchase Agreement permits the principal amount of

the deferred portion of the purchase price to be adjusted downward not more than
$1,000,000, if the "actual and anticipated losses on the collection of the amount of the
receivables as of the Closing Date exceed the reserve for losses as of the Closing Date". (R.
10.) Paragraph 1 of the Closing Agreement defines the Closing Date "for all purposes" of
the Purchase Agreements as December 13, 1982. (R. 18.)
4.

Richard A. Christenson ("Christenson") was president and chief executive

officer of Capitol until the fall of 1982. (R. 679.) Christenson became the president, chief
operating officer, and a director of the Bank at its inception in December 1982, and served
in those positions until November 1984. Id.
5.

On about September 28, 1984, Capitol and Zions entered into an Assignment

and Security Agreement (the "Assignment"). The Assignment gave Zions a security interest
in the receivable owed by Bank under the Asset Purchase Agreements. (R. 24-36)
6.

In November 1984, shortly after the Assignment was executed and the

underlying loan from Zions to Capitol was guaranteed by Christenson, the Bank terminated
Christenson. (R. 972.)
5

7.

Sometime between November 1984 and July 1985, Christenson was

reappointed as chief executive officer of Capitol.5
8.

On or about July 10, 1985, the Bank, Christenson, and Capitol entered into a

settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement")6 which purported to extinguish the
Bank's obligation to Capitol under the Purchase Agreements even though the right to receive
the payments was previously assigned. (R. 136-37.)
9.

The Settlement Agreement required the parties not to disclose the existence and

terms of the Settlement Agreement. (R. 140.)
10.

As a condition of his agreement to execute the Settlement Agreement,

Christenson was required to give the Bank an original signed personal financial statement
and statement of Capitolfs financial condition. (R. 135-36)
11.

Prior to July 1985, Christenson delivered his personal financial statements

which listed Capitol's receivable from the Bank under the Asset Purchase Agreements which,
by footnote, revealed the following language:
This represents my portion of the ownership of Capitol Thrift & Loan based
on the contract amount I have with First Security Financial. This receivable
has been pledged to Zions First National Bank,
(R. 682-83)(Emphasis supplied.)

5

(R. 998 (lines 11-25) - 999 (line 1)); (R. 1004)(lines 22-25).

6

(R. 974 (lines 22-25) to 975 (lines 1-10)).
6

12.

The received a third financial statement with identical language to that

referenced above from Christenson's attorney prior to July 1985. (R. 683).
13.

Christenson testified at trial that no representative, personnel of or attorney for

the Bank ever questioned him regarding his disclosure that the receivable evidenced by the
Purchase Agreements was pledged to Zions. (R. 991.)
14.

Capitol did not default on its obligation to Zions secured by the Assignment

until at least December 1985. (R. 682.) Thereafter, Zions questioned Christenson regarding
the default. Only when Capitol failed to cure the default did Zions first learn of the
Settlement Agreement.
15.

Zions, as assignee, sued the Bank, alleging that the collateral was wrongfully

extinguished. (R. 2-39.)
16.

In June 1990, after the suit was filed, Zions assigned its rights to 4447. (R.

17.

At trial, the trial court found that the Bank had not received adequate notice of

780.)

the Assignment notwithstanding Christensen's written disclosures. (R. 709.)
18.

4447 appealed (the "First Appeal"). Overturning the trial court, this Court

determined that the Bank received adequate notice of the Assignment through Christensen's
written disclosures. 889 P.2d 467, 474-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
19.

This Court also ruled:

Thus, in the context of an assignment, section 9-318 distinguishes
between claims and defenses arising from the contract and other unrelated
claims and defenses. An account debtor can assert claims and defenses based
7

on the terms of the contract whether they arise before or after notification of
an assignment. However, subsection (l)(b) limits assertion of unrelated claims
and defenses to those "which accrue[ ] before the account debtor receives
notification of the assignment." Id. § 70A-9-318(l)(b) (emphasis added). See
also West One Bank v. Life Tns. Co.: 887 P.2d 880, 885 n. 7 (Utah Ct.
App.1994) (secured creditor need only give notice of its interest in order to
have priority over later creditors subsequent right of setoff). Subsection (l)(b)
does not specify a particular form of notice, but simply precludes an account
debtor from raising a claim or defense against an assignee after the account
debtor is aware that the assignment exists.
The two-pronged notice requirement mandated by Utah Code Ann. §
70A-9-318(3) (1990) is not applicable to our analysis. . . . According to the
terms of section 9-318(l)(b), First Security, as an account debtor, can only
succeed if its claim or defense accrued before it received notice of the
assignment's existence.
889 P.2d at 472, n.8 (emphasis added).
20.

This Court concluded: "Accordingly, we reverse in part and affirm in part, and

remand to the trial court for entry of an appropriate judgment in favor of 4447 Associates in
accordance with this opinion." 889 P.2d at 476.
21.

On March 20, 1995, the Bank petitioned for certiorari. (R. 1686.)

22.

In its reply brief in support of its petition, the Bank raised for the first time

defenses under Section 70A-9-318(2). See Addendum C, Reply Brief in Support of Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari at 3-4.
23.

On June 5, 1995, the Utah Supreme Court denied certiorari and this Court's

decision in the First Appeal became final. (R.1687.)
24.

Collaterally, on June 19, 1995, the Bank petitioned for certiorari in a separate

case, America First Credit Union v. First Security Bank of Utah, N. A., Case No. 940483-CA.

8

There, the Bank argued that: "In a recent case before a different Court of Appeals panel, the
Court of Appeals refused to interpret and apply Section 9-318(3), the controlling statute in
this case, under circumstances that, combined with the results of this case, creates uncertainty
in application of what is a clear and unambiguous statute. See Zions First Nat'l Bank v. First
Security Financial, 255 Utah Adv. Rep. 69,

P.2d

(Utah Ct. App. 1995)(eert denied

(June 5, 1995). First Security respectfully requests that the issues be decided by the Utah
Supreme Court so that there can exist more certainty in common commercial transactions
involving collateral assignments of accounts." (R. 2008.)
25.

On September 21, 1995, the Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari in the

America First case. 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995).
26.

However, the Utah Supreme Court's January 21, 1997 opinion neither

overruled nor addressed this Court's decision in the First Appeal in this case. 930 P.2d 1198,
1198-1202 (Utah 1997).
27.

Following remand in this case, the trial court by minute entry granted 4447's

motion for summary judgment and denied the Bank's motion for a stay pending the Utah
Supreme Court's decision in America First. (R.2119-21.)
28.

On February 29, 1996, the trial court entered its Order on Plaintiffs Motion

for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Stay, ruling that:
1)
First Security's indebtedness owed to 4447 Associates under the
Asset Purchase Agreement, including principal and interest as of December 6,
1995, is $266,757.25 as shown in detail below. From and after December 6,
1995, interest shall continue to at the per diem rate of $33.51 in favor of 4447
Associates and against First Security.
9

I. UNPAID INTEREST PAYMENTS
Due Date of Interest
Payment

Unpaid Amount

Accrued
Interest to
December 6, 1995

12/13/84

$21,536.07

$23,660.18

3/13/85

24,849.31

26,687.48

6/13/85

25,401.51

26,640.27

9/13/85

25,401.51

26,000.01

12/13/85

25,125.41

25,717.41

Subtotal

122,313.81

128,705.35

II.

UNPAID CONTRACT BALANCE

12/13/85
7,777.42
(After $1,000,000 Downward
Adjustment on 12/13/85)
TOTAL (I & II)

7,960.67

$266,757.25

2)
4447 Associates' request for an award of attorney
fees under the Asset Purchase Agreement is GRANTED in an
amount to be determined at a later evidentiary hearing; however,
4447 Associates is not entitled to an award of attorney fees
regarding First Security's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
which was granted by the court on May 24, 1990 and affirmed
on appeal.
3)
First Security's defense under Section 70A-9318(2) is DENIED as the Settlement Agreement dated July 10,
1985 was more than a modification of the contract within the
meaning of Section 7QA-9-318(2); instead, the Settlement
Agreement improperly attempted to terminate and discharge
obligations owed under the Asset Purchase Agreement as found
by the appellate court.
10

(R. 2150-52)(emphasis added).
29.

After reviewing further extensive memoranda and oral argument, the trial court

denied the Bank's remaining challenges to the judgment, findings of fact and conclusions of
law on July 1, 1997. R. 2348-2359. Among other things, the trial court found that the
Bank's defenses were inapplicable and were insufficient because the evidence was
ambiguous:
1.
There is insufficient evidence in the record to support
defendant's defenses to entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff. The inferences
which defendant requests the Court to draw from the ambiguous evidence
admitted at trial and now argued by defendant are insufficient to establish
defendant's defenses. Specifically:
a.
Defendant's defenses regarding its breach of
warranty defenses and claims against Capitol Thrift and Richard
Christenson are not supported by the evidence in the record.
b.
Defendant's defenses pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated Section 70A-9-318, are not supported by the decision
of the Court of Appeals and are not supported by the evidence
in the record.
c.
Defendant's remaining defenses whereby it alleges
that it is not obligated to pay plaintiff the payments owed under
the Asset Purchase Agreement are likewise not supported by the
evidence in the record.
(R. 2352)(emphasis added).
30.

The trial court also found the following facts regarding the award of attorney

fees, which were also stipulated to by the parties:
2.
Prior to hearing argument on attorney fees and costs, the parties
stipulated that plaintiff incurred reasonable attorney fees and costs through
February 28, 1997 in its prosecution of this action in the amount of
11

$103,358.40 and that defendant incurred reasonable attorney fees and costs in
defense of this action in the amount of $107,824.60. The parties further
stipulated that if plaintiff were entitled to attorney fees and costs the amount
of attorney fees and costs awarded to plaintiff should be reduced in an amount
equal to 10% of the total fees and costs of plaintiff for fees and costs incurred
regarding defendant's motion for partial summary judgment and in an amount
equal to 10% of the total attorney fees and costs of defendant for fees incurred
in bringing the motion for partial summary judgment. The parties agreed not

to challenge their respective attorney fees and costs except as to entitlement
under the Asset Purchase Agreement.
3.
The Court finds the parties' stipulation regarding attorney fees
and costs to be reasonable under applicable Utah law. Specifically, plaintiff
incurred reasonable attorney fees and costs through February 28, 1997 in its
prosecution of this action in the amount of $103,358.40 and that defendant
incurred reasonable attorney fees and costs in defense of this action in the
amount of $107,824.60. Further, it is reasonable that attorney fees and costs
the amount of attorney fees and costs awarded to plaintiff should be reduced
in an amount equal to 10% of the total fees and costs of plaintiff for fees and
costs incurred regarding defendant's motion for partial summary judgment and
in an amount equal to 10% of the total attorney fees and costs of defendant for
fees and costs incurred in bringing the motion for partial summary judgment.

4.
The Court further finds pursuant to the stipulation of the parties
that the work described in the affidavits of counsel for plaintiff were actually
performed, that the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately

prosecute the matter, and that the attorneys' and other paralegal's billing rates
were consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar
services. The Court has further considered all other circumstances which
require consideration of additional factors pursuant to Utah law, including
those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility, and finds that fees and
costs of $82,240.12 were reasonably and necessarily incurred by plaintiff in

enforcing the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement, These fees and costs
incurred are awardable as they were incurred and arose under paragraph 22 of
the Asset Purchase Agreement.
5.
Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff is entitled to an award
of fees and costs of $82,240.12.
R. 2352-2354 (emphasis added).

12

31.

On July 29, 1997, the Bank filed its notice of appeal. R.2369-70.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This Court held in the First Appeal that Section 70A-9-318(1) applied to the facts of
this case, not Section 70A-9-318(3). 4447 Associates v. First Security Financial 889 P.2d
467, 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The Court then remanded the case for "entry of an
appropriate judgment in favor of 4447 Associates in accordance with this opinion." 889 P.2d
at 476. Further, the Court defined the "appropriate judgment"; the Court found that the
Bank's failure to give notice "entitles 4447 to an award of damages resulting therefrom,
presumably the amount due on the account, as properly reduced in accordance with the terms
of the asset purchase agreement as discussed above." 889 P.2d at 475 (emphasis added).
On remand, the trial court properly rejected the Bank's requests to apply the America
First decision and disregard this Court's mandate. The trial court also properly denied the
Bank's defenses which were rejected in the First Appeal or which the Bank failed to raise at
trial. The trial court was required to follow the mandate of this Court's decision in the First
Appeal. I Jtah Copper Co v. Dist. Court., 64 P.2d 241,250 (Utah 1937); accord Dreyer v. Bd.
of Trustees, 666 P.2d 1214, 1215 (Mont. 1983)(a trial court cannot refuse to carry out the
mandate of the appellate court). Accordingly, the trial court correctly entered judgment for
4447 for all amounts due under the Asset Purchase Agreement. R. 2150-52, 2357-58.
It is time that the Bank's endless assertion of defenses to judgment are terminated.
The Bank failed to assert defenses under Section 9-318(2) until after this Court's decision
in the First Appeal. The Bank cannot retry the case on remand after the mandate is issued
13

to the trial court to enter judgment in favor of 4447. Further, the Bank may not assert its
Section 9-318(3) defense on remand or in this appeal, as it was rejected in the First Appeal.
Finally, notwithstanding the Bank's attempt to characterize it otherwise, the parties' dispute
arises under the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement because 4447 was seeking recovery
of amounts due thereunder.
4447 respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's judgment and grant
its attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal under the Asset Purchase Agreement.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE BANK MAY NOT ASSERT DEFENSES UNDER SECTION 70A-9318(2) IN THIS APPEAL BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FOUND
THAT, THE BANK'S EVIDENCE OF ITS SECTION 9-318(2)
DEFENSE WAS "INSUFFICIENT" AND THE BANK HAS NOT
APPEALED THAT FINDING OR MARSHALED EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF THAT FINDING IN ITS INITIAL BRIEF.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE BANK DID NOT PRECLUDE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE BANK HAS NOT
APPEALED THAT RULING.

The Bank argues that the trial court erred in holding that the Bank and Capitol were
not entitled to modify the Asset Purchase Agreement under Section 70A-9-318(2) by the
Settlement Agreement. (Bank Brief at 16-18.)7 The Bank raised this defense on remand

7

The Bank presented this defense for the first time in its reply brief in support of its
petition for writ of certiorari, see Addendum C, which was rejected by the Utah Supreme
Court. The Bank failed to preserve this issue for appeal in the First Appeal and it cannot
be raised on remand thereafter for the first time. See infra, Section I. D.; ("Furthermore,
if a party fails to raise an issue and present evidence regarding the same, it has waived the
right to do so." Hilton Hotel v. Industrial Comm. of Utah, 897 P.2d 352, 356 (Utah Ct.
14

after entry of this Court's prior decision in opposition to 4447fs motion for summary
judgment and failed to present evidence supporting its claims in opposition to 4447fs motion
for summary judgment. (R. 1871-78.)8 Because the Bank raised after entry of this Court's
decision in the First Appeal, this issue was not properly before the trial court and is not
preserved for this appeal.
Section 70A-9-318(2) requires that "the assignee acquires corresponding rights under
the modified or substituted contract."9 While the Bank alleges that the Settlement Agreement
modified or was in substitution of the obligations under the Asset Purchase Agreement under
Section 70A-9-318(2), 4447 received no "corresponding rights under the modified or
substituted contract." Instead, the Bank wrongfully sought to terminate 4447fs rights, leaving
4447 with nothing. This Court observed:

App. 1995)(quating Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State Tax ComirTn, 847 P.2d 418,420 (Utah
Ct. App.1993); Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns: Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah
1984)(citations omitted)(emphasis added)).
8

The Bank further failed to respond to 4447fs Undisputed Material Facts as
required by Rule 4-501(2), Utah Code of Judicial Administration. R.l 869-71,1896-1897.
9

Section 70A-9-318(2) provides:

So far as the right to payment or a part thereof under an assigned
contract has not been fully earned by performance, and notwithstanding
notification of the assignment, any modification of or substitution for the
contract made in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial
standards is effective against an assignee unless the account debtor has
otherwise agreed but the assignee acquires corresponding rights under the
modified or substituted contract. The assignment may provide that such
modification or substitution is a breach by the assignor.
15

[Ajctual knowledge of the assignment's existence precludes substantial
interference with the assignee's rights, Legal commentators have noted that
under the UCC, an assignee's rights may be adversely affected by contract
modifications made by the account debtor and the assignor, but such actions
are 'unwarranted* if the assignee's rights are jeopardized by termination of the
contract or similar unilateral action.
889 P.2d at 475 (emphases added). Accordingly, the Asset Purchase Agreement was not
properly modified under Section 70A-9-318(2) as 4447 received no corresponding rights in
the Settlement Agreement.
The trial court on remand rejected the Bank's defense under Section 9-318(2). In its
order granting partial summary judgment, the trial court on remand found that the Settlement
Agreement did not extinguish the Bank's obligation to 4447: "First Security's defense under
Section 70A-9-318(2) is denied as the Settlement Agreement dated July 10, 1985 was more
than a modification of the contract within the meaning of Section 70A-9-318(2); instead, the
Settlement Agreement improperly attempted to terminate and discharge obligations owed
under the Asset Purchase Agreement as found by the appellate court/' R. 2152 (emphasis
added). Significantly, the Bank has not cited or attached this Order, (R. 2150-54), and has
not questioned the trial court's reasoning. Further, on summary judgment the Bank failed
to properly controvert 4447's undisputed facts as required under Rule 4-501(2), Utah Code
of Judicial Admin. (R. 1869-71, 1896-97). Accordingly, because the Bank has failed to
properly cite the order at issue, it has failed to preserve its Section 9-318(2) defense on
appeal and the trial court's ruling is unassailable.
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B.

THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT THE BANK'S EVIDENCE
OF A SECTION 9-318(2) DEFENSE WAS INSUFFICIENT
PRIOR TO ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.

The trial court again rejected the Bank's Section 9-318(2) argument prior to entry of
judgment when the Bank again reargued that the Settlement Agreement modified and
extinguished the indebtedness owed under the Asset Purchase Agreement, including interest
payments. (R. 2125-26, 2179-80.) The Bank alleged that certain defenses had accrued
which entitled the Bank to offset amounts owed to 4447 and to modify the obligations owed
under the Asset Purchase Agreement because of the Settlement Agreement. (R. 2125-26,
2179-80.) Following careful review of the Bank's "evidence" concerning modification of
the Asset Purchase Agreement, the trial court found the Bank's evidence was insufficient:
There is insufficient evidence in the record to support defendant's defenses to
entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff The inferences which defendant
requests the Court to draw from the ambiguous evidence admitted at trial and
now argued by defendant are insufficient to establish defendant's defenses.
(R. 2352(emphasis added).)
The Bank has not appealed this finding. It is not before this Court. See Bank Brief
at 1-2. Accordingly, even if the Bank could assert defenses under Section 70A-9-318(2)(and
it cannot), the unappealed trial court finding of insufficient evidence of that defense is fatal
to the Bank's Section 9-318(2) challenge.
C.

THE BANK HAS WAIVED ANY SECTION 70A-9-318(2)
DEFENSE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT PRESERVED AT TRIAL.

Even if a Section 9-318(2) defense were applicable and supported by evidence (and
it is not), the Bank waived it. The Bank argued on remand that Section 70A-9-318(2)
17

entitled the Bank and Capitol to modify the Asset Purchase Agreement and extinguish 4447fs
interest. (R. 1871-78.) However, the Bank may not argue new legal or factual positions on
remand that were not addressed at trial:
Raising an issue not addressed by the parties is inappropriate and outside of
the discretion given the governing tribunal because it encroaches upon the
advocate responsibility conferred upon counsel. Furthermore, if a party fails
to raise an issue and present evidence regarding the same, it has waived the
right to do so.
Hilton Hotel v. Industrial Comm, of Utah, 897 P.2d 352, 356 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)(quoling
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 847 P.2d 418,420 (Utah Ct. App.1993); Combe
v. Warrenfs Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984)(citations
omitted)(emphasis added). By failing to assert its Section 70A-9-318(2) "defense" at trial,
the Bank waived the argument or, alternatively, is now barred from asserting it on remand.
See also Pretrial Order (omitting Section 70A-9-318(2) as a defense). (R. 675-94.)
II.

THE BANK MAY NOT REARGUE THE SECTION 70A-9-318(3)
DEFENSE PREVIOUSLY REJECTED BY THIS COURT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THIS
COURT'S PRIOR, FINAL DECISION APPLYING SECTION
70A-9-318(l) PRECLUDES THE BANK'S SECTION 70A-9-318(3)
ON REMAND.

The Bank next incorrectly challenges the trial court's decision to preclude the Bank's
alleged Section 70A-9-318(3) defense. (Bank Brief at 8-15.) This Court already addressed
and rejected this very argument, holding that Section 70A-9-318(1) applied here. 889 P.2d
at 472, n.8. The Court put it this way:
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The two-pronged notice requirement mandated by Utah Code Ann. §
70A-9-318(3) (1990) is not applicable to our analysis. Section 9-318(3) sets
forth the notice requirements for an assignee to receive payments directly from
the account debtor. Tn the instant case, the question of whether Zions was
entitled to receive payments from First Security as they came due does not
merit consideration.
889 P.2d at 472, n.8 (emphasis added). This Court also stated:

The parties also debate the question of whether First Security ever received,
beyond mere notice of the assignment, notice to make payment directly to
Zions as contemplated in I Jtah Code Ann. § 70A-9- 318(3) (1990). Tt clearly
did not, and we decline to address the issue further, See, e.g., State v. Carter,
776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989) (declining to consider issues without merit);
State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788, 795 (Utah Ct. App.1992) (same), cert, denied,
857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).
Id. at 470, n.5. Construing section 9-318, the Court found that, in the context of an
assignment, section 9-318 distinguishes between claims and defenses arising from the
contract and other unrelated claims and defenses. 889 P.2d at 472. An account debtor can
assert claims and defenses based on the terms of the contract whether they arise before or
after notification of an assignment. Id. This Court then stated:
However, subsection (l)(b) limits assertion of unrelated claims and defenses
to those "which accrue[ ] before the account debtor receives notification of the
assignment.,f Id. § 70A-9-318(l)(b) (emphasis added). See also West One
Bank v. Life Tns. Co. : 887 P.2d 880, 885 n. 7 (Utah Ct. App.1994) (secured
creditor need only give notice of its interest in order to have priority over later
creditor's subsequent right of setoff). Subsection (l)(b) does not specify a
particular form of notice, but simply precludes an account debtor from raising
a claim or defense against an assignee after the account debtor is aware that the
assignment exists.
According to the terms of section 9-318(l)(b), First Security, as an account
debtor, can only succeed if its claim or defense accrued before it received

notice of the assignment's existence.
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889 P.2d at 472. On remand, the trial court followed this Court's decision in the First Appeal
and found, "Defendant's defenses pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9-318(3)
are not supported by the decision of the Court of Appeals

" (R. 2352 (emphasis added)).

Accordingly, the trial court properly precluded the Bank from asserting defenses under
Section 70A-9-318(3) pursuant to this Court's prior decision.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED THE BANK'S
ARGUMENT UNDER AMERTCA FIRST,

The Utah Supreme Court decided America First, interpreting Section 70A-9-318(3),
while this case was on remand but prior to entry ofjudgment. The Bank incorrectly suggests
that America First governs and required the trial court to apply Section 70A-9-318(3).
(Bank's Brief at 9-15.) America First does not assist here because this Court's ruling in the
First Appeal did not involve application of Section 70A-9-318(3). 4447 Associates, 889 P.2d
at 472, n.8. This Court held that Section 70A-9-318(l) applied, not Section 70A-9-318(3).
868 P.2d at 472, n.8. Construing Section 70A-9-318, the Court held that the subsections
"distinguish[] between claims and defenses arising from the contract and other unrelated
claims and defenses." 889 P.2d at 472. This holding was not reversed (nor even questioned)
by the America First Court; despite the Bank's request that the Supreme Court in America
Eksl overturn this Court's decision in the First Appeal. (R. 2007-08.) See America First,
930 P.2d at 1198-1202.
Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that America First did not apply on remand:
This Court has the authority to consider and apply the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in America First Credit Union v. First Security of Utah, No. 95074
20

(Utah January 21,1997); however, the America First decision is not applicable
to this action as the Court's decision interprets Utah Code Annotated Section
70A-9-31S(3)T not Section 70A-9-318(l).
(R. 2355 (emphasis added).) Which subsection of Section 70A-9-318 to apply here was
decided in the First Appeal and is now final as law of the case and is res judicata.
The Bank also filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court in the
First Appeal and argued that Section 70A-9-318(3) applied to this case, not Section 9-318(1).
See Addendum C at 1-4. Under law of the case principles, issues decided or which could
have been decided if properly raised, cannot be raised after remand. QL Baker v. Lane Co.,
586 P.2d 114 (Or. App. 1978); Adamson v. Traylor, 402 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1985); C&J
Industries, Inc. v. Bailey, 669 P.2d 855, 856 (Utah 1983)(ffthe express ruling by this Court
on all issues raised by prior appeal becomes the law of the case and is binding upon the
parties, the trial court, and this court."); Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Assfn v. St. Paul
Ins. Companies, 448 P.2d 724 (Utah 1968). Accordingly, under res judicata and law of the
case doctrines, the Bank cannot again raise its Section 70A-9-318(3) defense, previously
rejected by this Court. 889 P.2d at 472, n.8.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED 4447 ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS AS THE PREVAILING PARTY UNDER THE
ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT.

With the Bank's liability fixed, the trial court correctly found that 4447 prevailed on
disputes "arising under" the Asset Purchase Agreement, and properly awarded attorney's fees
consistent with this Court's decision in the First Appeal. 889 P.2d 467, 476 (Utah Ct. App.
1995). Ignoring the foundation for this issue (the Asset Purchase Agreement), the Bank
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assails the attorneys' fees award by casting the dispute with 4447 as one not "aris[ing] under"
the Asset Purchase Agreement. (Bank Brief at 19.) The Bank, instead, says the dispute
centers on whether the Bank "received notice of a subsequent assignment of the Asset
Purchase Agreement." Id. Characterization, it seems, means everything.
This dispute is simply said: Was 4447 entitled to interest payments, the remaining
principal and attorney fees and costs due under the Asset Purchase Agreement. On remand,
the trial court found that 4447 was so entitled. (R.2150-52.) This Court recognized in the
First Appeal that the Asset Purchase Agreement enabled 4447 to recover amounts owed
under the Asset Purchase Agreement. 868 P.2d at 475 ("[The Bank's] failure to . . .[notify
plaintiff] entitles 4447 Associates to an award of damages resulting therefrom, presumably
the amount due on the account, as properly reduced in accordance with the terms of the asset
purchase agreement as discussed above.")(Emphasis added). In sum, the Bank's view that
the dispute with 4447 did not arise under the Asset Purchase Agreement is mystical at best.
The trial court also found that the fees awarded were "reasonably and necessarily incurred
by plaintiff [4447] in enforcing the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement. These fees and
costs incurred are awardable as they were incurred and arose under paragraph 22 of the Asset
Purchase Agreement." (R. 2354.) Again, the Bank does not appeal this finding and failed
to marshal evidence supporting it.10 Thus, whether the fees were reasonably and necessarily

"Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2d 487, 489 (Utah Ct. App.l993))(c/ft>ig
Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989).
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incurred in enforcing the Asset Purchase Agreement is not before this Court. The trial court
correctly awarded attorneys' fees to 4447 under the Asset Purchase Agreement.
IV.

4447 IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS ON
APPEAL.

Drawn again into further proceedings on appeal, it is reasonable and proper for this
Court to award 4447 additional attorneys' fees and costs incurred defending the present
appeal. The Bank challenges 4447fs entitlement to prevail under the Asset Purchase
Agreement. 4447 has established in the trial court and here that it prevails under the Asset
Purchase Agreement. Regardless of how the Bank characterizes things, the continuing
"dispute" arises under the Asset Purchase Agreement. 4447 is entitled to an award of
reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons show above, 4447 respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial
court's judgment and grant its attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal under the Asset
Purchase Agreement.
DATED this 13th day of August, 1998.
Respectfully submitted,
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR

/Jeffrey M. Jones
( / Mark Gibb
Attorneys for 4447 Associates
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Tab A

RCP Rule 56, RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
*119 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
PART VII. JUDGMENT
Current with amendments received through
11-15-97

RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover
upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time
after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a
motion for summary judgment by the adverse
party, move with or without supporting affidavits
for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or
any part thereof.
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom
a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted
or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any
time, move with or without supporting affidavits
for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or
any part thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The
motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed
and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The
judgment sought shall be rendered if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
A summary judgment, interlocutory in character,
may be rendered on the issue of liability alone
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount
of damages.
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If
on motion under this rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief
asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the
hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable
ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts
are actually and in good faith controverted. It

Page 1
shall thereupon make an order specifying the
facts that appear without substantial controversy,
including the extent to which the amount of
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and
directing such further proceedings in the action as
are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so
specified shall be deemed established, and the
trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony;
Defense Required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a
motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall
be entered against him.
*120 (f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable.
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons
stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or
may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it
appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time
that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to
this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for
the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith
order the party employing them to pay to the
other party the amount of the reasonable expenses
which the filing of the affidavits caused him to
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and
any offending party or attorney may be adjudged
guilty of contempt.
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RCP Rule 56, RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[Amended effective November 1, 1997.]
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UT ST § 70A-9-318, Defenses against assignee-Modification of contract after notification of
assignment-Term prohibiting assignment ineffective-Identification and proof of assignment

Page 1

Utah Code § 70A-9-318
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 70A. UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
CHAPTER 9. SECURED
TRANSACTIONS-SALES OF
ACCOUNTS, CONTRACT RIGHTS
AND CHATTEL PAPER
PART 3. RIGHTS OF THIRD
PARTIES-PERFECTED AND
UNPERFECTED SECURITY
INTERESTS-RULES OF PRIORITY
Current through End of 1997 General and 1st and
2nd Sp. Sess.

§ 70A-9-318. Defenses against assigneeModification
of
contract
after
notification
of
assignment—Term
prohibiting
assignment
ineffectiveIdentification and proof of assignment
(1) Unless an account debtor has made an
enforceable agreement not to assert defenses or
claims arising out of a sale as provided in Section
70A-9-206 the rights of an assignee are subject
to:
(a) all the terms of the contract between the
account debtor and assignor and any defense or
claim arising therefrom; and
(b) any other defense or claim of the account
debtor against the assignor which accrues before
the account debtor receives notification of the
assignment.

(2) So far as the right to payment or a part
thereof under an assigned contract has not been
fully earned by performance, and notwithstanding
notification of the assignment, any modification
of or substitution for the contract made in good
faith and in accordance with reasonable
commercial standards is effective against an
assignee unless the account debtor has otherwise
agreed but the assignee acquires corresponding
rights under the modified or substituted contract.
The assignment may provide that such
modification or substitution is a breach by the
assignor.
(3) The account debtor is authorized to pay the
assignor until the account debtor receives
notification that the amount due or to become due
has been assigned and that payment is to be made
to the assignee. A notification which does not
reasonably identify the rights assigned is
ineffective. If requested by the account debtor,
the assignee must seasonably furnish reasonable
proof that the assignment has been made and
unless he does so the account debtor may pay the
assignor.
(4) A term in any contract between an account
debtor and an assignor is ineffective if it prohibits
assignment of an account or prohibits creation of
a security interest in chattel paper or a security
interest in a general intangible for money due or
to become due or requires the account debtor's
consent to such assignment or security interest.
*20850 As last amended by Chapter 197, Laws of Utah
1990.

Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318 (1990):
(1) Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable
agreement not to assert defenses or claims arising out of a sale
as provided in Section 70A-9-206 the rights of an assignee are
subject to:
(a) all the terms of the contract
between the account debtor and assignor and
any defense or claim arising therefrom; and
(b) any other defense or claim of the
account debtor against the assignor which
accrues before the account debtor receives
notification of the assignment•
(2) So far as the right to payment or a party thereof
under an assigned contract has not been fully earned by
performance, and notwithstanding notification of the assignment,
any modification of or substitution for the contract made in good
faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards is
effective against an assignee unless the account debtor has
otherwise agreed but the assignee acquires corresponding rights
under the modified or substituted contract. The assignment may
provide that such modification or substitution is a breach by the
assignor.
(3) The account debtor is authorized to pay the
assignor until the account debtor receives notification that the
amount due or to become due has been assigned and that payment is
to be made to the assignee. A notification which does not
reasonably identify the rights assigned is ineffective. If
requested by the account debtor, the assignee must seasonably
furnish reasonable proof that the assignment has been made and
unless he does so the account debtor may pay the assignor.

iv

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF
SECTION 70A-9-318(l) BECAUSE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
IN THIS INSTANCE AROSE FROM THE ASSET PURCHASE
AGREEMENT.
The court of appeals incorrectly held that the

Settlement Agreement in this case was "totally unrelated to" the
original contract.

4447 Associates argues the Settlement

Agreement does not arise from the terms of the contract because
it covers more obligations than represented by the Purchase
Agreements.

For example, 4447 Associates points out that the

Settlement Agreement covers Christenson's claim against First
Security for wrongful termination.
4447 Associates argues that "the Purchase Agreements
make no reference to Christenson at all."

Respondent's Brief in

Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11. This is
simply incorrect.

The Asset Purchase Agreement states:

"[I]t is

of the essence to this transaction that Capitol's president and
executive vice president, Richard A. Christenson and Bruce L.
Moesser, respectively, become officers in FS Financial."

See

Asset Purchase Agreement at 5 (emphasis added) (for the court's
convenience, a copy of the Asset Purchase Agreement is attached
as Addendum A) .
Further, 4447 Associates' argument overlooks the court
of appeals' own finding that Richard Christenson's financial
statement, which was submitted in conjunction with the Settlement

1

Agreement, had a "uniquely close nexus to the main purpose of the
Settlement Agreement."

Addendum A to Petition for Writ of

Certiorari at 12 (emphasis added).
4447 Associates also asserts that the Settlement
Agreement does not arise out of the terms of the Purchase
Agreements because of mention made in the Settlement Agreement of
certain claims involving property in East Canyon and a personal
guaranty of Christenson.

However, the only reason these items

are mentioned in the Settlement Agreement is to exclude them from
the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

Far from establishing

that the Settlement Agreement covers items not arising from the
Purchase Agreements, the exclusion of extraneous items actually
demonstrates that the Settlement Agreement does arise from the
terms of the Purchase Agreements.
4447 Associates argues that courts have held that
settlement agreements do not arise from the terms of a contract.
In support of its argument 4447 Associates cites no Utah cases.
The two cases it does cite do not apply here.

In Bank Leumi

Trust Co. v. Collins Sales Serv.• 393 N.E.2d 468 (N.Y. 1979), the
court held that section 318 did not apply to an agreement made to
set off moneys owed to a third party that was not a party to the
underlying agreement.

Id. at 470.

In In re Bancroft Dairy,

Inc.. 10 B.R. 920 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981), there was a question
as to whether the terms of the settlement agreement in the case
"were ever carried out."

Id. at 923.
2

Further, the Bancroft

court was careful to note that "considering the release agreement
itself as a separate defense, not arising from the terms of the
contract, does not prevent the account debtors from asserting
defenses which may have been considered when the parties were
negotiating the release agreement."

Id. at 925. Thus at the

very least, the Bancroft case, which is cited by 4447 Associates,
stands for the proposition that the case should be remanded to
the district court so that if Zions is not subject to the
Settlement Agreement, at least First Security will be able to
assert against Zions' assignee the defense that Capitol breached
its warranties to First Security under the Purchase Agreements
concerning the quality of the assets it was selling to First
Security.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT MAY AFFIRM THE DECISION OF THE
DISTRICT COURT ON THE BASIS OF SECTION 70A-9-318 (2).
First Security has argued that section 70A-9-318(2)

supports the argument that First Security was entitled to settle
its differences with its original creditor.

4447 Associates

argues that this is a new argument that cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.

First, the argument is not a new one.

First Security has consistently argued that it was free to pay
its original creditor through the means of a settlement
agreement.

First Security has merely offered additional support

for its argument.

This is no different from 4447 Associates'
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citing the appellate court to additional cases that were not
brought to the attention of the district court.
Further, Utah case law is clear that the appellate
court can affirm the decision of the lower court on any proper
basis, even if it was not considered by the district court. See.
e.g.. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah
1988).
III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION 70A9-318(3) DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE.
First Security argued to the court of appeals that

section 70A-9-318(3) authorized First Security to satisfy its
obligation to its original creditor until it received notice of
(1) the assignment and (2) the duty to begin paying Zions
directly.

4447 Associates argues that a settlement agreement

cannot constitute "payment11 under section 318 (3).l

The question

of whether a settlement agreement can constitute a payment is an
important question that should be decided by the Utah Supreme
Court.

4447 Associates offers no Utah cases for its contention

that settlement agreements cannot constitute payments. As
pointed out above, the two cases cited by 4447 Associates from
other jurisdictions do not apply here.

1

Therefore, the court

4447 Associates also argues that First Security failed to
raise this issue below. However, in response to questions at
oral argument First Security cited the court of appeals to the
case of Judah AMC & Jeep, Inc. v. Old Republic Ins. Co.. 293
N.W.2d 212, 214 (Iowa 1980). That case holds that under section
318(3), which authorizes a debtor to "pay" the original creditor,
a debtor had a right to "settle" with its creditor.
4

should grant the petition for certiorari so that this important
question concerning commercial law can be decided by the Utah
Supreme Court.
IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FOOTNOTE
IN CHRISTENSON'S FINANCIAL STATEMENT CONSTITUTED
SUFFICIENT NOTICE OF THE ASSIGNMENT.
4447 Associates argues that the Time Finance case is

not applicable.

However, it is the only Utah case cited by

either party on the question of the type of notice that must be
received by an account debtor.

4447 Associates has offered no

reason why different policies should apply to commercial
transactions than to insurance transactions.

This court should

grant the petition for a writ of certiorari so that the supreme
court can clarify the important issue of what kind of notice must
be received by an account debtor.
CQNCLVglQN
For the foregoing reasons, First Security Financial
respectfully requests that this court issue a Writ of Certiorari
and review the decision of the court of appeals in this case.
DATED this

fv

day of May, 1995.
RAY, OUINNEY & , N E B E K E /

Scott H. Clark
Craig Carlile
Brent D. Wride
Attorneys for First Security
Financial, DefendantAppellee
5

CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the J & L > d a y of May, 1995,
two true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI were mailed, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Jeffrey M. Jones
J. Mark Gibb
DURHAM, EVANS & JONES
50 South Main
Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
and one copy was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Randall D. Benson
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
10 East South Temple
Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Craig Carlile
Brent D. Wride
Attorneys for First Security
Financial, DefendantAppellee
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ASSET PDRCHASE AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this If day
of
T^x-^t »^-^y>
, 1982, by and between First Security
Financial, a Utah corporation ("FS Financial"); Capitol Thrift and
Loan Company, a Utah corporation ("Capitol"); Richard A.
Christenson, an individual ("Christenson"); and Bruce L. Moesser,
an individual ("Moesser").
R E C I T A L S

:

A. Capitol is an operating industrial loan corporation
under the lavs of the State of Utah.
B.

Christenson is the majority stockholder of Capitol.

C. Christenson and Moesser are the president and
executive vice president of Capitol, respectively.
D. FS Financial is a newly organized industrial loan
corporation under the laws of the State of Utah.
E. Upon consummation of the transactions contemplated
here inr FS Financial will be a wholly owned subsidiary of First
Security Corporation ("FS Corp.").
F. FS Financial is in the process of acquiring the
assets and liabilities of Murray First Thrift & Loan Company
("MFT") pursuant to that certain Purchase and Assumption Agreement
between FS Financial, FS Corp., MFT, et al., dated j)zcLmbu~ /5,
1982 (the "MFT Agreement").
G. In connection with and contingent upon its
acquisition of MFT, FS Financial desires also to acquire the
assets of Capitol, and Capitol is willing to sell its assets to
FS Financial, on the terms and conditions set forth below.
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1. Purchase of Assets. Capitol hereby agrees to sell
to FS Financial, and FS Financial hereby agrees to purchase from
Capitol, all of the assets of Capitol as shown on the audited
balance sheet of Capitol dated June 30, 1982, attached hereto as
Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof by this reference, subject to
adjustment as provided in Paragraph 3 below. Included among the
assets sold shall be all leases, insurance policies and other
contract rights, and all books of account, customer records and
documents of every nature relating to the business of Capitol

being acquired by FS Financial. Not included among the assets
sold shall be the corporate documents, books and records which
relate to the overall organization and continuing financial
affairs of Capitol and only those additional specific items of
tangible and intangible personal property identified on Exhibit
"B"r attached hereto and made a part hereof by this reference, and
Capitol's leasehold interest in the premises currently occupied by
it in the Continental Bank Building in Salt Lake City, Utah.
2. Consideration. As consideration for the purchase
of the assets of Capitol, except as limited in the following
sentence, FS Financial agrees to assume all of the liabilities of
Capitol set forth on the balance sheet attached hereto as Exhibit
"A," as adjusted pursuant to Paragraph 3 below, and also all
liabilities of Capitol which may be asserted after the Closing
Date which relate to the collection of any of the receivables of
Capitol acquired by FS Financial and which were incurred in the
normal course of business prior to the Closing Date, and to
indemnify and hold Capitol harmless therefrom. Not included among
the liabilities assumed shall be any liabilities of Capitol not
expressly disclosed on said balance sheet (other than those
incurred in the normal course of business prior to Closing which
relate to the collection of receivables), any liabilities arising
out of or in connection with Capitol's leasehold interest in its
premises in the Continental Bank Building, and any accrued but
unpaid wages, employment taxes, employee benefit plan liabilities,
net income, franchise, sales, use, property and any other state or
Federal tax liabilities, including any tax liabilities arising as
a result of this transaction, and Capitol agrees to indemnify and
hold FS Financial harmless therefrom.
As further consideration, subject to adjustment as
provided in Paragraph 3 below, FS Financial agrees to pay Capitol
the sum pf One Million Three Hundred Seventy-Nine Thousand^Nine
Hundred Eleven and 78/100 Dollars ($1,379,911.78) cash, payable as
follows:
(a) Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00) at
the Closing (hereinafter defined);
(b) The balance of One Million One Hundred
Seventy-Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven and 78/100
Dollars ($1,179,911.78) shall be paid in a lump sum on
the third anniversary of the Closing Date;
(c) The principal amount of the deferred portion of
the purchase price shall earn interest at the rate of ten
percent (10.0%) per annum and accrued interest shall be
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paid in twelve (12) quarterly installments beginning
three (3) months after the Closing Date.
For purposes of arriving at the above purchase price, the assets
of Capitol were valued at their book value and the cash portion
of the purchase price was determined to be equal to the book net
worth of Capitol as shown on the balance sheet attached hereto as
Exhibit "A".
At the end of the three (3) year period of deferral and
prior to the payment of the principal amount of the deferred
portion of the purchase price, the real estate and receivables
of Capitol acquired by FS Financial shall be valued in the manner
set forth below. In the event that (i) the aggregate value of the
real estate is less than its book value as of the Closing Date
and/or (ii) the actual and anticipated losses on the collection of
the amount of the receivables as of the Closing Date exceeds the
reserve for losses as of the Closing Date, the principal amount
of the deferred portion of the purchase price shall be adjusted
downward in an equivalent amount. Further, the principal amount
of the deferred portion of the purchase price shall also be
adjusted downward in the amount of any liabilities of Capitol
relating to the collection of receivables which were incurred
in the normal course ot business prior to Closing bur were not
disclosed on Cr-oitol's balance sheet at Closing and which were
assumed by FS Financial hereunder. The aggregate of such downward
adjustments of the principal amount of the deferred portion of
the purchase price shall in no event exceed One Million Dollars
($1,000,000.00). Notwithstanding any such downward adjustments
of the principal amount of the deferred portion of the purchase
price, there shall be no adjustment of the amount of interest paid
by FS Financial under Paragraph 2(c) hereof during the three (3)
year period.
~*Actual and anticipated losses on receivables shall
include losses on those receivables already written off by FS
Financial in accordance with standard' financial practice and FS
Financial's actual experience and also one hundred percent
(100.0%) of those receivables classified either as a "loss" or
as "doubtful" by the Department of Financial Institutions in its
most recent examination of FS Financial, provided one has been
conducted within three (3) months prior to the end of the three
(3) year period; provided, further, if no such examination has
been conducted within the final three (3) months, the parties
shall call for one. Out-of-pocket costs of collection incurred
by FS Financial with respect to any such receivables (other than
with respect to any liabilities relating to the collection of
receivables which have been assumed by FS Financial hereunder),
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including without limitation reasonable attorney's fees, shall be
added to the principal amount of such receivables in determining
the amount-of loss suffered thereon. Any such receivables which
are written off by FS Financial or which are classified as a
"loss" or as "doubtful" for purposes of this paragraph shall be
reassigned to Capitol by FS Financial at the end of the three (3)
year period.
Any remaining unsold real estate at the end of the three
(3) year period shall be valued by M.A.I, appraisal as of that
time. To the extent any real estate has been sold during the
three (3) year period, it shall be valued at its contract sales
price. In both cases, the value of the real estate shall be
reduced by the costs of sale and preparation for sale, such as
necessary fix-up expenses, if any, incurred by FS Financial.
In order to facilitate the above valuations, FS Financial
shall keep its books in such a way that the receivables and real
estate acquired from Capitol can be separately identified at all
times during the three (3) year period.
3. Changes Prior to Closing. To the extent there are
changes in the assets, liabilities and net worth of Capitol
between June 30, 1982, and the Closing Date, which changes are a
result of transactions entered into in the ordinary course of
business, it is understood and agreed by the parties that those
assets being sold by Capitol to FS Financial shall be the assets
of Capitol, as defined herein, as of the Closing Date, and that
those liabilities being assumed by FS Financial shall be the
liabilities of Capitol, as defined herein, as of the Closing
Date. Further, the principal amount of the deferred portion of
the purchase price shall be adjusted up or down, as the case may
be, in an amount equal to the change in the book net worth of
Capitol between June 30, 1982, and the Closing Date. For €his
purpose,^Capitol shall prepare a balance sheet of those of its
assets and liabilities as of the Closing Date which are included
in the sale, complete with detailed schedules identifying
individual assets and liabilities and also any off-balance sheet
items included in the sale. At the Closing, the parties shall
execute an appropriate amendment to this Agreement specifying the
principal amount of the deferred portion of the purchase price as
adjusted in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph.
Capitol hereby represents and warrants that the balance
sheet attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is true, complete and
accurate in every material respect as of June 30, 1982, and that
during the period beginning June 30, 1982, and ending on:the date
of this Agreement there have been no material changes in the
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assets and liabilities of Capitol other than as a result of
transactions entered into in the ordinary course of business*
Capitol hereby covenants and agrees that during the period
beginning with the date of this Agreement and ending on the
Closing Date, it shall not enter into any transactions other than
in the regular course of business. Capitol further represents and
warrants that the balance sheet to be prepared by it as of the
Closing Date will be true, complete and accurate in every material
respect as of the Closing Date.
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, it shall
be a condition precedent to the obligation of FS Financial to
close this transaction that there have been no material changes in
the assets or liabilities of Capitol between June 30, 1962, and
the Closing Date, and that the representations, warranties and
covenants of Capitol contained in this Paragraph shall not have
been breached in any material respect.
4. Payment of Indemnity. The amount of any payment made
by FS Financial or Capitol to a third party for which FS Financial
or Capitol is entitled to indemnification hereunder shall accrue
interest at the rate of ten percent (10.0%) per annum from the
date of payment by FS Financial or Capitol to said third party
through the date of reimbursement by the indemnifying party. If
FS Financial is the party entitled to indemnification, it may
require payment immediately or, at its option, it may set off the
principal and interest portions of the amount of such indemnity
against the payments otherwise due Capitol under Subparagraphs
2(b) and 2(c), respectively, as adjusted pursuant to Paragraph 3,
above. If Capitol is the party entitled to indemnification, it
may require payment immediately or, at its option, it may add the
principal and interest portions of the amount of such indemnity to
the payments otherwise due it under Subparagraphs 2(b) and^2(c),
respectively, as adjusted pursuant to Paragraph 3, above. ~
5. Personnel. It is contemplated that FS Financial will
employ all of the current personnel of Capitol in FS Financial's
operation. In particular, it is of the essence to this
transaction that Capitol's president and executive vice president,
Richard A. Christenson and Bruce L. Moesser, respectively, become
officers in FS Financial. However, the terms of any such
employment arrangement shall be subject to good faith negotiations
between the parties and no assurances are given in this Agreement
as to what the particulars of such employment arrangements can or
will be. It is understood, however, that all employee benefits or
claims, whether of a pension, health or other nature, which have
accrued or which arise out of events prior to the Closing Date,
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shall be and remain the sole liability of Capitol, and Capitol
agrees to indemnify and hold FS Financial harmless therefrom.
6. Noncompetition. During such time as Christenson and
Moesser are employed by FS Financial, Christenson and Moesser
covenant and agree, each for himself, that he will not engage,
directly or indirectly, whether as sole proprietor, partner,
shareholder, officer, director, employee or consultant, in any
activity in the industrial loan, thrift and loan or banking
industry in the State of Utah except as an officer and employee of
FS Financial. It is understood that Christenson, Moesser, Sally
Taylor, and Merlyn Hanks are officers and/or trustees of and will
continue to have an ownership and participation in Franklin
Financial, Cape Trust, the corporate entity surviving Capitol
Thrift and Loan (which is contemplated to be named "The Capitol
Company"), Capitol Leasing, Seahurst, and affiliated companies,
and that they will be allowed to wind down and preserve the value
of these assets without being in violation of the terms of this
Agreement.
If at any time Christenson or Moesser leave the employ of
FS Financial, for any reason, Christenson and Moesser covenant and
agree, each for himself, that he will not divulge or make use of
any trade secrets, customer information or other confidential
knowhow or information gained by him as a result of his employment
by FS Financial nor will he solicit other persons to leave their
employ with FS Financial, other than Christenson1s personal
secretary, Sally Taylor. Also, for one (1) year after leaving the
employ of FS Financial, Christenson agrees not to engage in any
activity in direct competition with FS Financial in the thrift and
loan industry.
Further, Capitol agrees to change its name as of the
Closing Date and to transfer to FS Financial at the Closing* all
rights t5 the use of its name, but reserving to itself the right
to use any other name which includes the name "Capitol* but not
the words "Thrift and Loan" or any combination thereof.
7. Government Approvals. It shall be a condition
precedent to the obligation of FS Financial to close this
transaction that FS Corp shall have received the prior approval
of the Federal Reserve Board to acquire the shares of FS Financial
in connection with FS Financial's acquisition of the assets and
liabilities of Capitol and MFT as set forth herein and in the MFT
Agreement. It shall be a further condition precedent hereto that
the Utah Department of Financial Institutions shall have given its
approval to this transaction, and that there be no other required
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regulatory approval or consent which has not been obtained.
shall be a further condition precedent hereto that the MFT
Agreement be consummated in accordance with' its terms.

It

8. Closing. The closing of this transaction (the
"Closing" or "Closing Date") shall take place at the same time and
place and simultaneously with the closing of the MFT Agreement,
but in no event later than six (6) months after the date of this
Agreement. At the Closing, Capitol shall transfer title to those
of its assets being sold to FS Financial by quit claim deed, bill
of sale, or other appropriate instrument of transfer, and FS
Financial shall assume all of the liabilities of Capitol which it
has agreed to assume hereunder by an appropriate assumption
agreement. At the Closing, FS Financial shall also pay to Capitol
the portion of the purchase price payable under Paragraph 2(a)
hereof, and the parties shall execute an appropriate amendment to
this Agreement to specify the exact Closing Date and the principal
amount of the deferred portion of the purchase price payable under
Paragraph 2(b) hereof, as adjusted at the Closing pursuant to
Paragraph 3 hereof.
9. Guaranty. Christenson hereby guarantees that the
representations and warranties made by Capitol herein are true,
complete and accurate in every material respect as of the date
for which they are made, and hereby guarantees the performance by
Capitol of its obligation of indemnity with respect to liabilities
and obligations of Capitol not assumed by FS Financial hereunder,
such guaranties to be continuing, absolute, unconditional and
primary.
10. Press Releases. All parties agree that no press
release or other statement, whether written or verbal, shall be
made or given to any representative of the news media with respect
to this transaction without the express prior approval of all
other parties.
11. Corporate Authority. Capitol represents and
warrants that it is a duly organized, validly existing corporation
in good standing under the laws of the State of Utah; that it is
in full compliance with all laws, regulations, orders and other
governmental rulings which regulate or purport to regulate
Capitol's operation as an industrial loan corporation in the State
of Utah; that it has full corporate power and authority to
execute, deliver and carry out the provisions of this Agreement,
including the necessary consent of its shareholders; and that when
so executed and delivered this Agreement shall constitute a legal,
valid and binding obligation of Capitol, enforceable against it in
accordance with its terms. FS Financial represents and warrants
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that it is a duly organized, validly existing corporation in good
standing under the laws of the State of Utah; that it has full
corporate power and authority to execute, deliver and carry out
the provisions of this Agreement; and that when so executed and
delivered this Agreement shall constitute a legal, valid and
binding obligation of FS Financial, enforceable against it in
accordance with its terms. The representations and warranties
made in this paragraph shall be deemed made as of the date hereof
and again at the Closing. Capitol and FS Financial agree to
provide each other at the Closing with certified copies of Board
of Directors and shareholder resolutions authorizing this
transaction.
12. Survival. The parties understand and agree that all
representations and warranties made herein are true and effective
both when made and as of the Closing, and that all such
representations and warranties shall survive the Closing.
13. Notice. Any notice or other communication to any
party under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be deemed
to have been given on the date on which such notice is either hand
delivered to the party to whom such notice is directed or is
deposited in the United States mail as a certified or registered
letter, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, properly
addressed to such party at the address specified below:
If to FS Financial, at:
First Security Financial
P. 0. Box 30006
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130
Attn: Treasurer
If to Capitol, at:
c/o Richard A. Christenson
2356 Dallin Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
If to Christenson, at:
c/o First Security Financial
135 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

-8-

With a copy to:
Richard A. Christenson
2356 Dallin Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
If to Moesser, at:
c/o First Security Financial
135 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
With a c^oy to:
Bruce L. Moesser
2467 East 3750 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84109

Any such address may be changed by giving notice thereof to the
other parties in accordance with the above procedure.
14. Binding Effect. This Agreement shall inure to the
benefit of and be binding upon the parties and their respective
legal representatives, heirs, successors and assigns.
15. Counterpart Originals. For the convenience of the
parties, this Agreement shall be executed in four (4) counterpart
originals, which taken together shall constitute a single agreement.
16. Headings. The headings of the Paragraphs herein have
been inserted for ease of reference only and shall not control or
affect the meaning or interpretation of any of the terms and
provisions hereof.
17. Governing Law. This Agreement is entered into under
and shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah.
18. Further Action. The parties hereby agree to execute
and deliver such additional documents and to take such further
action as may become necessary or desirable to fully carry out the
provisions and intent of this Agreement.
19. Severability. In the event one or more of the
provisions contained in this Agreement shall, for any reason be held
invalid, illegal or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity,
illegality or unenforceability shall not affect the validity,
legality and enforceability of any other provision hereof, and this
Agreement shall be construed as if such invalid, illegal or
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unenforceable provision had never been contained herein, provided
that the Agreement as so modified preserves, the basic intent of the
parties.
20. Construction. As used herein, all words in any gender
shall be deemed to include the masculine, feminine, or neuter
gender, all singular words shall include the plural, and all plural
words shall include the singular, as the context may require. The
term "person" shall include an individual, corporation, partnership,
trust, estate or any other entity.
21. Prior Agreements Superseded. This Agreement supersedes
any prior understandings or agreement? among the parties, whether
written or verbal, respecting the within subject matter, and contains
the entire understanding of the parties with respect thereto.
22. Enforcement. In the event of a dispute among the
parties arising under this Agreement, the party or parties prevailing in such dispute shall be entitled to collect their costs from
the other parties, including without limitation court costs and
reasonable attorney's fees.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this
Agreement on the date hereinabove first written.
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL
By

^£»*m~4^>^^/^v
Elmer D. Tucker
Vice President

CAPITOL THRIFT AND LOAN COMPANY

Richard-A^- Christenson,
Individually

Bruce L. Moesser,
Individually
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Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq. (1741)
J. Mark Gibb, Esq. (5702)
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR
Key Bank Tower, Suite 850
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 538-2424

«fora J-.tficiai District

Attorneys for Plaintiff 4447 Associates

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
a National Banking Association
and 4447 ASSOCIATES, a Utah
)
general partnership,
)
)

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR STAY

Plaintiff,
v.
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL,
a National corporation

i
;

Case No. 870901578CN

1

Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendant.
This case is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment
entered

by

(the "Motion") pursuant to the remand ordeif

the Utah

Court

of Appeals

on

January

6,

1995. *

Plaintiff 4447 Associates ("4447 Associates") moves the Court for
entry of summary judgment and an award of damages due under the
Asset Purchase Agreement and Closing Agreement dated December 10,
1982 which 4447 Associates alleges are five (5) unpaid interest
payments, the unpaid contract balance, together with interest
thereafter, the Utah Supreme Court denied First Security's
petition for a writ of certiorari in an order dated June 5, 1995.
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thereon, and its attorney fees and costs. Defendant First Security
Financial

("First Security") opposed

the Motion

and asserted

defenses contained in Utah Code Section 70A-9-318(1)(b), Section
70A-9-318(2) and Section 70A-9-318(3) . The Motion came before the
Court for oral argument on December 6 and 22, 1995. Prior to that
time, the parties filed extensive memoranda in support of and in
opposition to the Motion.

First Security further filed a Motion

for Stay which was opposed by 4447 Associates.
Having fully considered the issues in this case, the Court
declines at this time to grant plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment or Defendant's Motion for Stay. Rather, the court will at
this time make the following findings and rulings which shall
govern further proceedings in this case.
1)
under

First Security's indebtedness owed to 4447 Associates

the Asset

Purchase

Agreement,

including

principal

and

interest as of December 6, 1995, is $266,757.25 as shown in detail
below. From and after December 6, 1995, interest shall continue to
at the per diem rate of $33.51 in favor of 4447 Associates and
against First Security.

2

I.

UNPAID INTEREST PAYMENTS

Due Date of Interest

Unpaid Amount

Payment

Accrued

to

December 6, 1995

12/13/84

$21,536.07

$23,660.18

3/13/85

24,849.31

26f687.48

6/13/85

25,401.51

26f640.27

9/13/85

25,401.51

26,000.01

12/13/85

25,125.41

25,717.41

Subtotal

122,313.81

128,705.35

II. UNPAID CONTRACT BALANCE
12/13/85
7,777.42
(After $1,000,000 Downward
Adjustment on 12/13/85)
TOTAL (I & II)
2)

Interest

7,960.67

$266,757.25

4447 Associates' request for an award of attorney fees

under the Asset Purchase Agreement is GRANTED in an amount to be
determined at a later evidentiary hearing; however, 4447 Associates
is not entitled

to an award of attorney

fees regarding First

Security's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment which was granted by
the court on May 24, 1990 and affinned on appeal.
3)

First Security's defense under Section 70A-9-318(2) is

DENIED as the Settlement Agreement dated July 10, 1985 was more
than a modification of the contract within the meaning of Section
70A-9-318(2);

instead,

the

Settlement

Agreement

improperly

attempted to terminate and discharge obligations owed under the
Asset Purchase Agreement as found by the appellate court.
4)

The Court will allow First Security to marshal evidence

in the record currently before the Court in support of its claim
3

that

Section

70A-9-318(1)(b)

indebtedness described above.

is

a defense

to

payment

of

the

First Security will file and serve

a memorandum regarding its defense under Section 70A-9-318(1)(b) on
or before February 12, 1996.

4447 Associates will file and serve

its response thereto on or before March 8, 1996.

Thereafter, the

Court will hold a hearing to determine whether First Security's
alleged defense under Section 70A-9-318(1)(b) precludes the entry
of judgment against First Security as described in this order.
5)

Defendant's argument relating to Section 70A-9-318(3) and

Defendant's Motion to Stay are taken under advisement.
DATED this ^ l r \

day of

\~^\l&

,

BY THE COURT:

FRANK G. NOEL
DISTRICT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

James S. Jardine
Scott H. Clark
Brent D. Wride
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR

[4.

pffrey M. Jones
J/. Mark Gibb

4

, 1996.
^-^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing Order On Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Stay to be hand-delivered this
day of February, 1996, to the following:
James S. Jardine
Brent D. Wride
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
jmg/4447msj.ord
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*949 Judicial Administration Rule 4-501
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION
PART I. JUDICIAL COUNCIL
RULES OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION
CHAPTER 4. OPERATION OF THE
COURTS
ARTICLE 5. CIVIL PRACTICE
Current with amendments received through
11-15-97

RULE 4-501. MOTIONS
Intent. To establish a uniform procedure for
filing motions, supporting memoranda and
documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting
and scheduling hearings on dispositive motions.
To establish
dispositions.

a

procedure

for

expedited

Applicability. This rule shall apply to motion
practice in all district courts except proceedings
before the court commissioners and small claims
cases. This rule does not apply to petitions for
habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary
relief.
Statement of the Rule.
(1) Filing
Memoranda.

and

Service

length memorandum, the application shall state
the length of the principal memorandum, and if
the memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the
application shall include a summary of the
memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(b) Memorandum in Opposition to Motion.
The responding party shall file and serve upon
all parties within ten days after service of a
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the
motion, and all supporting documentation. If
the responding party fails to file a memorandum
in opposition to the motion within ten days after
service of the motion, the moving party may
notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court
for decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of
this rule.
(c) Reply Memorandum. The moving party
may serve and file a reply memorandum within
five days after service of the responding party's
memorandum.
*950 (d) Notice to Submit for Decision.
Upon the expiration of the five-day period to
file a reply memorandum, either party may
notify the Clerk to submit the matter to the court
for decision. The notification shall be in the
form of a separate written pleading and
captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." The
notification shall contain a certificate of mailing
to all parties. If neither party files a notice, the
motion will not be submitted for decision.
(2) Motions for Summary Judgment.

of

Motions

and

(a) Motion and Supporting Memoranda. All
motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters,
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
points and authorities, appropriate affidavits,
and copies of or citations by page number to
relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or
other documents relied upon in support of the
motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a
motion shall not exceed ten pages in length
exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as
provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by
order of the court on ex-parte application. If an
ex-parte application is made to file an over-

(a) Memorandum in Support of a Motion.
The points and authorities in support of a
motion for summary judgment shall begin with
a section that contains a concise statement of
material facts as to which movant contends no
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in
separate numbered sentences and shall
specifically refer to those portions of the record
upon which the movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in Opposition to a Motion.
The points and authorities in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment shall begin with
a section that contains a concise statement of
material facts as to which the party contends a
genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be

Copyright (c) West Group 1998 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works

J ADMIN Rule 4-501, RULE 4-501. MOTIONS
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall
specifically refer to those portions of the record
upon which the opposing party relies, and, if
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed.
All material facts set forth in the movant's
statement and properly supported by an accurate
reference to the record shall be deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment
unless specifically controverted by the opposing
party's statement.

Page 2
time.
*951 (e) In those cases where a hearing is
granted, a courtesy copy of the motion,
memorandum of points and authorities and all
documents supporting or opposing the motion
shall be delivered to the judge hearing the
matter at least two working days before the date
set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly marked
as courtesy copies and indicate the date and
time of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not
be filed with the clerk of the court.

(3) Hearings.
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered
without a hearing unless ordered by the Court,
or requested by the parties as provided in
paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below.
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion
would dispose of the action or any issues in the
action on the merits with prejudice, either party
at the time of filing the principal memorandum
in support of or in opposition to a motion may
file a written request for a hearing.
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the
court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to
the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive
issue or set of issues governing the granting or
denial of the motion has been authoritatively
decided.
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the
court shall notify the requesting party. When a
request for hearing is granted, the court shall set
the matter for hearing or notify the requesting
party that the matter shall be heard and the
requesting party shall schedule the matter for
hearing and notify all parties of the date and

(f) If no written request for a hearing is made
at the time the parties file their principal
memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be
deemed waived.
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at
least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial
date. No dispositive motions shall be heard
after that date without leave of the Court.
(4) Expedited Dispositions. Upon motion and
notice and for good cause shown, the court may
grant a request for an expedited disposition in any
case where time is of the essence and compliance
with the provisions of this rule would be
impracticable or where the motion does not raise
significant legal issues and could be resolved
summarily.
(5) Telephone Conference. The court on its
own motion or at a party's request may direct
arguments of any motion by telephone
conference without court appearance. A verbatim
record shall be made of all telephone arguments
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel.
[Amended effective November 1, 1996.]
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4447 ASSOCIATES, a Utah general
partnership; and Zions First National
Bank, a
national banking association; Plaintiffs
and Appellant,
v.
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, a Utah
corporation, Defendant and Appellee.

correctness, according no deference to trial
court's legal conclusions.
[1] APPEAL AND ERROR k863
30k863
Appellate court reviews trial court's decision
to grant partial summary judgment for
correctness, according no deference to trial
court's legal conclusions.

No, 930293-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Jan. 6, 1995.
Assignee of asset purchase agreement
appealed from judgment of the District Court,
Salt Lake County, Frank G. Noel, J., holding
that account debtor was not responsible under
assignment of account of security. The Court
of Appeals, Orme, P.J., held that: (1)
downward adjustment value of asset purchase
agreement at issue was to be calculated on
agreement closing date, and not on payment
due date; (2) account debtor received notice
of existence of assignment prior to
extinguishing debt as part of its settlement,
and thus, account debtor could not extinguish
account, for reasons not contemplated in
underlying contract, without consent of
assignee; and (3) account debtor had duty to
notify assignee of pending settlement.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
vacated.
[1] APPEAL AND ERROR k842(2)
30k842(2)
Appellate court reviews trial court's decision
to grant partial summary judgment for

[2] ASSNiNIMI NTS 1,1 \4
38kl34
Assignee seeking to enforce assignment had
burden of proving account debtor received
notice of assignment, since assignee would
materially
benefit
from
favorable
determination of its rights.
[3] APPEAL AND ERROR k842(l)
30k842(l)
Determination concerning whether party had
notice or knowledge of particular transaction
or occurrence is finding of fact and will not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, but
determination concerning effect of notice
presents question of law, reviewed for
correctness. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a).
[3] APPEAL AIM 11 II! RROR k I I MIS I (K III
30kl008.1(8.1)
Determination concerning whether party had
notice or knowledge of particular transaction
or occurrence is finding of fact and will not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, but
determination concerning effect of notice
presents question of law, reviewed for
correctness. Rules Civ Proc, Rule 52(a).
[4] APPEAL AND ERROR k757(3)
30k757(3)

In order to challenge findings of fact,
appellant must marshall all evidence
supporting findings and then demonstrate that
despite this evidence, trial court's findings are
so lacking in support as to be against clear
weight of evidence.
[4] APPEAL AND ERROR kl012.1(4)
30kl012.1(4)
In order to challenge findings of fact,
appellant must marshall all evidence
supporting findings and then demonstrate that
despite this evidence, trial court's findings are
so lacking in support as to be against clear
weight of evidence.
[5] SALES k72(4)
343k72(4)
Downward adjustment value of asset purchase
agreement at issue was to be calculated on
agreement closing date, and not on payment
due date, since contract, read in its entirety,
unambiguously stated that adjustment in value
was to be done three years after closing date.
[6] SECURED TRANSACTIONS kl88
349Akl88
Account debtor received notice of existence of
assignment of asset purchase agreement prior
to extinguishing debt as part of its settlement
with asset seller, and thus, account debtor
could not extinguish account, for reasons not
contemplated in underlying contract, without
consent of assignee; although account debtor
received no written notice of assignment, and
though debtor's president did not know
assignment had actually been made, financial
statements referring to assignment, submitted
to debtor's counsel in conjunction with
settlement, were sufficient to confer actual
notice of assignment.
[7] SECURED TRANSACTIONS kl85.1
349Akl85.1
In context of assignment, Uniform
Commercial
Code
(UCC)
provision

addressing assignments of security interests
distinguishes between claims and defenses
arising from contract and other unrelated
claims and defenses, and thus, account debtor
can assert claims and defenses based on terms
of contract whether they arise before or after
notification of assignment, but assertion of
unrelated claims and defenses are limited to
those which accrue before account debtor
receives
notification
of
assignment.
U.C.A.1953, 70A-9-318, 70A- 9-318(l)(b).
[8] SECURED TRANSACTIONS kl82
349Akl82
While filing financing statement is
constructive notice that is effective for other
purposes under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), it does not suffice
for actual notice required in provision
regulating assignment of security interests.
U.C.A.1953, 70A-9-312(5)(a), 70A-9-318.
[9] SECURED TRANSACTIONS kl31
349Akl31
Financing statement only offers notice that
security interest may exist, and requires
potential creditors to make further inquiry to
confirm existence or specific details of
transaction. U.C.C. § 9-402 comment.
[10] SECURED TRANSACTIONS kl85.1
349Akl85.1
Account debtor, unlike potential creditor, is
not obligated to check UCC recordings
continually to ascertain whether debt has been
assigned, and filed financing statement offers
no actual notice of assignments existence that
would affect account debtor's right to assert
subsequent claims and defenses. U.C.A.1953,
70A-9-318(l)(b).
[11] SECURED TRANSACTIONS kl31
349Akl31
One can receive "notice," under Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), when it comes to
one's attention, regardless of circumstances

through which notice was received.
U.C.A.1953, 70A-l-201(26)(b)(i).
[12J SECUltl II I li HNS VI I IUNS I I ^
349Akl88
Account debtor had duty to notify assignee of
asset purchase agreement of pending
settlement with seller and debtor's president,
which extinguished debtor's debt, since debtor
had knowledge of assignment prior to
settlement. U.C.A.1953, 70A-9-318(l)(b).
[13J SECURED TR \NS\< I It INS U hi
349Akl83
Actual knowledge of another's property
interest may limit one's right to acquire or
interfere with that property, and thus, since
secured creditor acquires personal property
right, actual knowledge of assignment's
existence precludes substantial interference
with assignee's rights. U.C.A.1953, 70Al-201(37)(a).
[14] SUBROGATION k31(4)
366k31(4)
Doctrine of equitable subrogation cannot be
used by subsequent lender to trump prior
intervening lien if lender had actual
knowledge of lien.
[15J VENDOR AND PURCHASER k72H( 1)
400k228(l)
Subsequent purchaser of land cannot cut off
prior unrecorded interest in land if purchaser
had personal knowledge of prior conveyance.
*468 Jeffrey M. Jones and J. Mark Gibb, Salt
Lake City, for appellant.
Craig Carlile and Brent D. Wride, Provo, for
appellee.
Before BILLINGS, ORME and WILKINS,
JJ.
OPINION

ORME, Presiding Judge:
Plaintiff 4447 Associates appeals the trial
court's judgment that defendant First Security
Financial, as an account debtor, is not
responsible to 4447 Associates under an
assignment of the account for security. We
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
In December 1982, First Security Financial
and Capitol Thrift and Loan entered into an
asset purchase agreement, whereby First
Security purchased substantially all of
Capitol's assets for $1,379,911. Under the
agreement, First Security paid $200,000 to
Capitol at closing, with interest payments due
quarterly and the remaining principal due in
December 1985. [FN1]
This deferred
principal payment was subject to an offset, not
to exceed $1,000,000, based on any
subsequent reduction in the transferred assets'
value prior to the 1985 due date. Also,
Richard Christenson, Capitol's majority
shareholder, was named president of First
Security, but still retained the presidency of
Capitol until June 1984.
FN1. At closing, the parties reduced
the purchase price to $1,207,777.42,
leaving $1,007,777.42 as the deferred
balance.
*469 In June 1984, Capitol stockholders,
including Christenson, sold all their interest
and the remaining assets of Capitol, which
consisted of its receivable from First Security
and its charter, to AFS Holding Company, an
affiliate of the Bertagnole Investment
Company. Emanuel Floor, a Bertagnole
partner, replaced Christenson as president of
Capitol.
On September 28, 1984, Bertagnole reached
agreement with Zions Bank to restructure

Capitol's pre-existing debt to Zions of
$870,000 into a $1,000,000 revolving loan.
To secure the loan, Capitol assigned Zions its
rights to the payments due from First Security
under the purchase agreement. In conjunction
with the loan re-negotiation, Zions
commercial loan officer Allen Potts and
Bertagnole
Management
Company
vice-president Ronald Mitchell obtained
Christenson's personal guaranty for $870,000,
the amount of the original Capitol debt owed
to Zions.
Floor executed a notice of
assignment [FN2] as part of the loan
documentation, and testified that all the
documents were taken by Bertagnole
employees to be delivered, filed, or recorded
as appropriate. Potts testified that he
instructed his secretary at Zions to mail a copy
of the notice of assignment to First Security as
per the address specified in the asset purchase
agreement for giving notice to First Security,
which included the notation "Attn:
Treasurer." He did not instruct that the
mailing be registered or certified. [FN3]
Elmer Tucker, First Security's treasurer during
this period, never received the notice and had
no knowledge of the assignment until 1986.
Zions never obtained acknowledgement from
First Security that it had received notice of the
assignment or of its purported obligation to
make future payments jointly to Zions and
Capitol, and Zions apparently never followed
up with a written or verbal inquiry as to
whether First Security received the notice.
Nor, apparently, did Zions complain or inquire
when, at the next scheduled quarterly
payment, it did not see a check from First
Security on which Capitol and Zions were
shown as joint payees.
FN2. Capitol's notice stated, in part, as
follows:
Notice is hereby given that Capitol...
has assigned to Zions ... for purposes
of security, and granted to Zions a
security interest in all amounts owing

to Capitol and all rights of Capitol to
receive payment from First Security
Financial pursuant to the aforesaid
Asset Purchase Agreement....
You are hereby requested and
instructed to make all future payments
pursuant to said Asset Purchase
Agreement payable jointly to Capitol
and Zions.
FN3. Zions's office procedure for
handling mail is similar to that of
many large offices. Zions employees
who prepare letters for mailing leave
them unstamped at designated
locations to be picked up and
delivered to a central mail room.
There, other employees affix the
appropriate postage and deposit the
mail with the post office at the end of
the work day.
In November 1984, Christenson was
terminated as president of First Security, and
some time between December 1984 and July
1985, he regained the position as president of
Capitol that he had relinquished in June 1984,
incident to the Bertagnole buyout. In order to
resolve disagreements related to Christenson's
departure from First Security, Christenson,
Capitol, and First Security entered into a
settlement agreement on July 10, 1985.
Among its terms was an agreement by both
Capitol and Christenson to release First
Security from all remaining obligations under
the 1982 asset purchase agreement,
specifically including payment of the principal
balance due.
In conjunction with his
negotiations with First Security, Christenson
delivered three personal financial statements
prior to July 1985. On each statement,
Christenson listed as an asset his interest in
Capitol's receivable from First Security, with
the notation that the "receivable has been
pledged to Zion's First National Bank."

Capitol had made payments, via checks from
Bertagnole, on its restructured Zions loan, but
defaulted in December 1985. Zions notified
First Security on February 14 and 19, 1986,
that Capitol had defaulted and that Zions "may
be looking" to its security interest in First
Security's payment obligations under the 1982
asset purchase agreement. In response, First
Security, which denied receipt of any prior
notice of the assignment, informed Zions that
its debt to Capitol had been fully discharged
as part of the July 1985 settlement accord.

The issues surviving the partial summary
judgment were tried to the court on January 6
and 7, 1992. Subsequently, the trial court
issued its Memorandum Decision and
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and
entered a judgment in favor of First Security
on November 3, 1992. The trial court found
that First Security had no duty to pay Zions,
as assignee of Capitol's account receivable, or
to notify Zions of its intent to settle its
obligation to Capitol. 4447 Associates now
appeals.

*470 On March 4, 1987, Zions filed a
complaint against First Security, seeking a
determination of the amount owed to Capitol
by First Security under the asset purchase
agreement and an order requiring First
Security to pay Zions, as Capitol's assignee,
this amount. First Security filed a motion
seeking a partial summary judgment on
February 23,1990. The trial court granted the
motion, holding that pursuant to the asset
purchase agreement's provision for a "change
in value" offset to the principal payment due
in December 1985, the amount due must be
adjusted downward by $1,000,000, the
maximum amount permitted under the
agreement, given the uncontroverted evidence.

ISSUES

4447 Associates, the sole appellant in this
case, first acquired a stake in these
proceedings when it purchased a participation
interest in the Capitol note and collateral from
Zions in late 1986. In June 1990, Zions
assigned to 4447 Associates all of its
remaining right, title, and interest in the
Capitol note. [FN4]
FN4. Thus, 4447 Associates emerged
in an unenviable position:
the
assignee of an assignee of a right to
payment that was purportedly
extinguished by the parties to the
underlying transaction before anything
was ever realized on the assignment.

4447 Associates raises the following issues
on appeal that merit discussion: (1) whether
the trial court erred in finding that First
Security did not have notice of the assignment
of its Capitol obligation to Zions prior to
entering into a settlement agreement that
extinguished the obligation; (2) whether the
trial court erred in concluding that, even with
knowledge of the assignment, First Security
had no duty to obtain consent from Zions
prior to entering into the settlement
agreement; and (3) whether the trial court
erred in its partial summary judgment
determination that the value offset provision
of the asset purchase agreement reduced the
remaining principal due by $1,000,000. [FN5]
FN5. The parties also debate the
question of whether First Security ever
received, beyond mere notice of the
assignment, notice to make payment
directly to Zions as contemplated in
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9- 318(3)
(1990). It clearly did not, and we
decline to address the issue further.
See, e.g., State v. Carter, 776 P.2d
886, 888-89 (Utah 1989) (declining to
consider issues without merit); State
v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788, 795 (Utah
App.1992) (same), cert, denied, 857
P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1] We employ several standards of review in
resolving this appeal. We review the trial
court's decision to grant partial summary
judgment "for correctness, according no
deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions." Christensen v. Swenson, 874
P.2d 125,127 (Utah 1994). Accord Brown v.
Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah App.1994).
"Summary judgment is appropriate when the
record indicates that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Christensen, 874 P.2d at 127. "In addition, we
[examine] all relevant facts and all inferences
arising from those facts in the light most
favorable" to the non- moving party. Id.

Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah
1992) (receipt of notice of anticipatory
repudiation is a question of fact). In order to
challenge findings of fact, the appellant must
marshall all evidence supporting "the findings
and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the trial court's findings are so
lacking in support as to be 'against the clear
weight of the evidence.1 " Mountain States
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553
(Utah App.1989) (quoting In re Bartell, 776
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)). However, a
determination concerning the effect of the
notice presents a question of law, reviewed for
correctness. Kasco, 831 P.2d at 89.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ASSET
VALUE OFFSET

[2] Because 4447 Associates would
materially benefit from a favorable
determination of its rights as an assignee
seeking to enforce an assignment, it bore the
burden of proving First Security received
notice of the assignment. See Bank of Salt
Lake v. Corporation of the President of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
534 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah 1975). See also
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108
(Utah 1991) (party asserting that another party
assumed assignor's liabilities has burden of
proving assumption); First Inv. Co. v.
Andersen, 621 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1980)
(assignee of non-*471 negotiable notes has
burden of proving maker issued notes for
consideration); Peoples Fin. & Thrift Co. v.
Landes, 28 Utah 2d 392, 503 P.2d 444,446 n.
3 (1972) (assignee of account receivable has
burden of proving account debtor had notice
of assignment).

[5] As indicated, First Security filed a motion
for partial summary judgement, contending
that, as a matter of law, the terms of the asset
purchase agreement provided for a downward
adjustment in the amount of $1,000,000, to be
applied to the principal payment owed by First
Security and due in December 1985. [FN6]
The asset purchase agreement provided, in
part, as follows:

[3] [4] A determination concerning whether a
party had notice or knowledge of a particular
transaction or occurrence is a finding of fact
and "will not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous." Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). See Kasco

At the end of the three (3) year period of
deferral and prior to the payment of the
principal amount of the deferred portion of
the purchase price, the real estate and
receivables of Capitol acquired by FS

FN6. According to the closing
statement, signed December 13, 1982,
which finalized the asset purchase
agreement between First Security and
Capitol, the deferred principal due in
December 1985 was $1,007,777.42.
See supra note 1. With application of
the maximum $1,000,000 offset for
the decline in asset value, the principal
balance owing would become
$7,777.42.

Financial shall be valued in the manner set
forth below. In the event that (i) the aggregate
value of the real estate is less than its book
value as of the Closing Date and/or (ii) the
actual and anticipated losses on the collection
of the amount of the receivables as of the
Closing Date exceeds the reserve for losses as
of the Closing Date, the principal amount of
the deferred portion of the purchase price shall
be adjusted downward in an equivalent
amount. Further, the principal amount of the
deferred portion of the purchase price shall
also be adjusted downward in the amount of
any liabilities of Capitol relating to the
collection of receivables which were incurred
in the normal course of business prior to
Closing but were not disclosed on Capitol's
balance sheets at Closing and which were
assumed by FS Financial hereunder. The
aggregate of such downward adjustments of
the principal amount of the deferred portion of
the purchase price shall in no event exceed
One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00).
4447 Associates incorrectly asserts that the
downward adjustment in value is to be
calculated on the asset purchase agreement
closing date of December 13,1982, and not on
the payment due date of December 13, 1985,
and that First Security's evidence did not show
a decrease in value as of the earlier closing
date. In support of its assertion, 4447
Associates points to certain terms of the
agreement, but fails to include a critical
sentence that states the adjustment is to be
calculated "[a]t the end of the three (3) year
period of deferral and prior to the payment of
the principal amount of the deferred portion of
the purchase price." Read in its entirety, the
contract unambiguously states that the
adjustment in value is to be done three years
after the closing date of December 13, 1982.
See Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 629 (Utah
App.1993) (according clear and unambiguous
contract terms "their plain and ordinary
meaning without resorting to extrinsic

evidence"), cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah
1994).
Moreover, although 444/ Associates
challenges the validity of First Security's
calculations supporting its claim of decreased
asset *472 value, 4447 Associates offers no
contrary affidavits or evidence to rebut these
calculations. Thus, we are unable to find any
evidence favorable to 4447 Associates that
would create an issue of material fact.
Accordingly, the trial court was correct m its
interpretation of the asset purchase agreement
offset provision and in its decision to grant
partial summary judgment in favor of First
Security. We turn now to the notice issues.
NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT
GENERALLY
[6J Our starting point is Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC),
pertaining to secured transactions. [FN7] See
Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A- 9-101 to -507 (1990
& Supp.1994).
In particular, section
70A-9-318 addresses assignments of security
interests in accounts, and states, in part, as
follows:
FN7. All 50 states have adopted the
bulk of the Uniform Commercial
Code, see 3A Uniform Laws
Annotated (U.C.C.) 1-2 (1992),
developed by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws with later assistance from the
American Law Institute. James J.
White & Robert S. Summers,
Handbook of the Law Under the
Uniform Commercial Code § 1
(1972). Comparable provisions with
identical wording, or at least the same
substantive meaning, exist in most of
the various state statutory schemes.
Thus, other courts' interpretations of

their commercial codes may be helpful in our
resolution of this appeal.
Unless an account debtor has made an
enforceable agreement not to assert defenses
or claims arising out of a sale ... the rights of
an assignee are subject to:
(a) all the terms of the contract between the
account debtor and assignor and any defense
or claim arising therefrom; and
(b) any other defense or claim of the account
debtor against the assignor which accrues
before the account debtor receives
notification of the assignment.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(l) (1990)
(emphasis added).
[7] Thus, in the context of an assignment,
section 9-318 distinguishes between claims
and defenses arising from the contract and
other unrelated claims and defenses. An
account debtor can assert claims and defenses
based on the terms of the contract whether
they arise before or after notification of an
assignment. However, subsection (l)(b)
limits assertion of unrelated claims and
defenses to those "which accrue[ ] before the
account debtor receives notification of the
assignment."
Id. § 70A-9-318(l)(b)
(emphasis added). See also West One Bank v.
Life Ins. Co., 887 P.2d 880, 885 n. 7 (Utah
App.1994) (secured creditor need only give
notice of its interest in order to have priority
over later creditor's subsequent right of
setoff). Subsection (l)(b) does not specify a
particular form of notice, but simply precludes
an account debtor from raising a claim or
defense against an assignee after the account
debtor is aware that the assignment exists.
[FN8]
FN8. The two-pronged notice
requirement mandated by Utah Code
Ann. § 70A-9-318(3) (1990) is not
applicable to our analysis. Section
9-318(3) sets forth the notice

requirements for an assignee to
receive payments directly from the
account debtor. In the instant case, the
question of whether Zions was entitled
to receive payments from First
Security as they came due does not
merit consideration. See supra note 5.
[8][9][10] In the case at hand, First Security's
$1,000,000 offset for the decreased value of
the assets arose directly from the contract
terms of its asset purchase agreement with
Capitol. When Zions took Capitol's interest in
the asset purchase agreement, its interest was
subject to the terms of the original contract
between First Security and Capitol, regardless
of whether First Security had notice of the
assignment. At issue here is whether First
Security was able to extinguish the debt
remaining after the $1,000,000 offset by
asserting a claim or defense not arising from
its original contract with Capitol. According
to the terms of section 9-318(l)(b), First
Security, as an account debtor, can only
succeed if its claim or defense accrued before
it received notice of the assignment's
existence. Thus, we now consider whether
First Security received notice of the
assignment prior to extinguishing the debt as
part of its settlement with Capitol and
Christenson.
FIRST SECURITY'S NOTICE OF THE
ASSIGNMENT
The UCC defines notice and the related
concept of knowledge of a fact as follows:
*473 A person has "notice" of a fact when:
(i) he has actual knowledge of it;
(ii) he has received a notice or notification
of it; or
(iii) from all the facts and circumstances
known to him at the time in question he has
reason to know that it exists.
A person "knows" or has "knowledge" of a
fact when he has actual knowledge of it.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-l-201(25)(a), (b)
(1990). Furthermore, one gives notice by
taking such steps as may be reasonably
required to inform the other person in
ordinary course whether or not the other
person actually comes to know of it.
A person "receives" a notice or notification
when:
(i) it comes to his attention; or
(ii) it is duly delivered at the place of
business through which the contract was
made or at any other place held out by him
as the place for receipt of such
communications.
Id. § 70A-l-201(26)(a), (b). The trial court
concluded that
First Security never received adequate, legal
notice of the Assignment sufficient to
impose an obligation on First Security
which would preclude First Security from
satisfying its obligations under the Purchase
Agreement directly with Capitol, the
original account creditor.
As the debate has been drawn by the parties
in this appeal, there are three means by which
First Security could have learned of the
assignment sufficient to satisfy section
1 -201 (26): by the written notice prepared by
Floor; through the personal knowledge of
Christenson, who for a time was First
Security's president; and from the notation on
Christenson's financial statements submitted
to First Security as part of the negotiations
culminating in the settlement agreement.
[FN9]
FN9. Zions perfected its security
interest by filing a UCC-1 financing
statement with the Utah Department of
Commerce. While filing a financing
statement is constructive notice that is
effective for other purposes under
Article 9, see Utah Code Ann. §
70A-9-312(5)(a) (1990) (establishing
priority among multiple security
interests by date of filing), it does not

suffice for the actual notice required
under section 70A-9-318. A financing
statement only offers notice that a
security interest may exist, and
requires potential creditors to make
further inquiry to confirm the
existence or specific details of the
transaction. See Sannerud v. First
Nat'l Bank, 708 P.2d 1236, 1241
(Wyo.1985); U.C.C. § 9-402 cmt. 2
(1989). An account debtor, unlike a
potential creditor, is not obligated to
check the UCC recordings continually
to ascertain whether the debt has been
assigned, and the filed financing
statement offers no actual notice of the
assignment's existence that would
affect an account debtor's right to
assert subsequent claims and defenses.
See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9318(l)(b) (1990); Chase Manhattan
Bank v. State, 40 N.Y.2d 590, 388
N.Y.S.2d 896, 898-99, 357 N.E.2d
366, 369 (1976) (financing statement
not actual notice that would bar
account debtor from asserting setoff).
A. Written Notice
The written notice prepared by Floor failed to
provide adequate notice, since there is no
evidence that First Security received it.
Neither Capitol nor Zions mailed it registered
or certified, and Zions did not secure written
or oral acknowledgement of receipt from First
Security. It is undisputed that the notice,
addressed to the treasurer of First Security,
was not received by then- treasurer Elmer
Tucker.
At least with respect to this
document, the trial court did not err in finding
that "[n]o individual representing or
authorized to act on behalf of First Security
received written notice of the assignment prior
to 1986."
B. Knowledge of Christenson

[11] Of course, the knowledge of
Christenson, president of First Security when
the assignment to Zions was made by Capitol,
can be imputed to First Security. [FN10] See,
e.g., *474 Tuft v. Federal Leasing Inc., 657
P.2d 1300, 1303 (Utah 1982) (corporate
officers' knowledge of foreclosure suit
imputed to corporation). It is evident that
Christenson knew of the assignment by the
time, some ten months after the assignment,
that he agreed to the settlement with First
Security. Still, there is nothing in the record
to show he knew during his tenure as First
Security president, which ended less than two
months after the assignment was made. 4447
Associates points to the fact that Christenson
was a party to various discussions relative to
Capitol's effort to refinance its obligations to
Zions and understood that the assignment to
Zions of Capitol's right to payment from First
Security was under discussion. However, the
only document Christenson signed when the
refinance arrangement was concluded was a
limited personal guaranty of Capitol's
payment to Zions. There was no testimony
showing that he had knowledge of other
aspects of the finalized transaction,
specifically an actual assignment by Capitol of
its right to payment from First Security. As
the trial court found, the discussions between
Potts and Christenson concerned "an intent by
Zions to enter into the agreement, [and
preceded] execution of the Assignment by
Capitol and Zions."
FN10. First Security incorrectly
argues that even if Christenson
received notice, it was only through
Capitol-related business dealings with
Zions and not in his capacity as an
officer of First Security. According to
the UCC, one can receive notice when
"it comes to his attention," Utah Code
Ann. § 70A-l-201(26)(b)(i) (1990),
regardless of the circumstances

through which the notice was
received.
Additionally, although
Christenson may have been "wearing
two hats," given the intertwined
financial relationship of Christenson,
Capitol, and First Security, both hats
were cut from the same cloth. Thus,
the fine distinction First Security seeks
to draw is untenable. If Christenson
knew of the assignment at any time
when he was president of First
Security, then First Security knew of
the assignment. How Christenson
knew is irrelevant.
We agree with the trial court that it is not
enough that Christenson knew Zions hoped to
receive an assignment as security for
repayment of Capitol's loan and that Capitol
was willing to make such an assignment—
Christenson had to know the assignment had
actually been made. Thus, 4447 Associates
failed to meet its burden of proving
Christenson knew the assignment had been
made at a time when he was also serving as
First Security's president.
C. Financial Statements
However, notification through Christenson's
submission to First Security of financial
statements referring to the assignment,
submitted in conjunction with the settlement
agreement that purportedly extinguished the
underlying debt between First Security and
Capitol, cannot be dismissed as easily.
A financial institution receives many
financial statements in the course of its
business, which clerical personnel may simply
examine for compliance with the institution's
lending guidelines.
It would be too
burdensome, as First Security contends, to
expect scrutiny of footnotes in every financial
statement submitted to ascertain the existence
of an encumbering security interest that might

affect the affairs of the receiving financial
institution, no matter how remote from the
transaction for which the financial statement
was submitted.
These particular financial statements,
however, were submitted in the course of
negotiations between Christenson and First
Security to settle their respective legal
differences and not in the ordinary course of
First Security's general lending business.
Furthermore, the notation stating that the
"receivable has been pledged to Zion's First
National Bank" concerned an asset that was at
the core of the negotiations which culminated
in the settlement agreement. Thus, there was
a uniquely close nexus between the revelation
in the financial statements and the main
purpose of the settlement agreement.
In addition, the trial court's factual findings
confirm that First Security had notice through
its receipt of the financial statements. The
court noted the reference to the assignment in
Christenson's financial statements, and also
found that at least one statement "was
delivered by Christenson's attorney to First
Security's attorneys prior to July, 1985." Both
First Security and 4447 Associates had
stipulated to these facts, as well as to the
evidence upon which the trial court based its
findings. The court received as evidence
correspondence between counsel for First
Security and counsel for Christenson that
indicated such a delivery; moreover, the
exchange of letters was made in the context of
documenting the settlement which featured
the purported release of the very right to
payment that the financial statement showed
had been assigned to another. Counsel for
First Security, acting as its agent, therefore
received the financial statement and would
have noted the assignment of the account in
the course of examining the financial
statement. See First Sec. Bank v. Banberry
Dev. Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1333 *475 (Utah

1990) (describing fiduciary
between attorney and client).

relationship

Therefore, the trial court incorrectly
concluded, contrary to its own findings of
fact, that "First Security never received
adequate, legal notice of the Assignment
sufficient to impose an obligation on First
Security." The notation on the financial
statements indicating Zions's interest in the
account was sufficient to confer actual notice
of the assignment on First Security.
Accordingly, First Security was not free to
extinguish the account in the context of the
settlement agreement with Capitol and
Christenson, for reasons not contemplated in
the underlying contract, without the consent of
Zions. [FN11]
FN11. We do not suggest that an
account cannot be modified in any
way after notice of assignment is
received. The account debtor and the
assignor are free to make changes as
provided by the original account
contract
or which may be
commercially reasonable within the
context of the transaction. However,
the settlement agreement in this case
unilaterally extinguished the account
in an effort to resolve legal differences
totally unrelated to, and not
contemplated in, the original contract.
DUTY IMPOSED BY NOTH T
[12][13][14][15] The trial court in the instant
case made the following conclusion pertinent
to any duty imposed on First Security through
actual knowledge or notice of the assignment's
existence:
Knowledge of the existence of the
Assignment alone, if any such knowledge
existed, did not impose a duty to inquire on
First Security.
This conclusion does not ring true. A

familiar principle of the law, particularly in
secured transactions, is that actual knowledge
of another's property interest may limit one's
right to acquire or interfere with that property.
See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-301(l)(c),
(d) (1990) (buyer not in ordinary course of
business purchases collateral free of an
unperfected security interest only if buyer has
no actual knowledge of interest). [FN 12]
FN12. Likewise, in the context of
property law, actual knowledge is a
critical factor. For example, the
doctrine of equitable subrogation
cannot be used by a subsequent lender
to trump a prior intervening lien if the
lender had actual knowledge of the
lien. Richards v. Security Pac. Nat'l
Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 609 (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah
1993). A subsequent purchaser of
land cannot cut off a prior unrecorded
interest in the land if the purchaser had
personal knowledge of the prior
conveyance. Utah Farm Prod. Credit
Ass'n v. Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904,
906 n. 2 (Utah 1987).
Accordingly, since a secured creditor acquires
a personal property right, see
id. §
70A-l-201(37)(a), actual knowledge of the
assignment's existence precludes substantial
interference with the assignee's rights. Legal
commentators have noted that under the UCC,
an assignee's rights may be adversely affected
by contract modifications made by the account
debtor and the assignor, but such actions are
"unwarranted" if the assignee's rights are
jeopardized by termination of the contract or
similar unilateral action. 9 Hawkland, Lord &
Lewis, UCC Series § 9-318:01 (Callaghan
1991). See also In re Apex Oil Co., 975 F.2d
1365, 1370 (8th Cir.1992) (holding company
acted unreasonably by setting off debt after
receiving notice of third party's security
interest in same debt).

Given these principles and a plain reading of
section 9-318(l)(b), which allows an account
debtor to raise claims and defenses against the
assignee not arising from the original contract
only before it receives notice of the
assignment, the trial court incorrectly
concluded that knowledge alone did not
impose any duty upon First Security. [FN13]
We hold that First Security had a duty to
notify Zions of the pending settlement with
Capitol and Christenson. Its failure to do so
entitles 4447 Associates to an award of
damages resulting therefrom, presumably the
amount due on the account, as properly
reduced in accordance with the terms of the
asset purchase agreement as discussed above.
FN13. "[I]f the obligation assigned
could be obliterated or diminished by
events happening after the assignment
and notice of the assignment to the
obligor, the assignment would be
precarious collateral." Seattle-First
Nat'l Bank v. Oregon Pac. Indus., Inc.,
262 Or. 578, 500 P.2d 1033, 1035
(1972) (en banc). See also Larry D.
Bishop,
Note,
Commercial
Transactions:
Protection of the
Account Debtor Within and Without
UCC § 9-318(1), 35 Okla.L.Rev. 415,
420-25 (1982) (explaining rights and
responsibilities of account debtor after
receiving notification of assignment).
*476 CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's decision to grant
partial summary judgment in favor of First
Security, thereby allowing the value
adjustment of $1,000,000 on the principal
amount owed by First Security under the asset
purchase agreement. We conclude that notice
of an assignment's existence precludes an
account debtor from extinguishing the account
post-assignment, and thereby substantially
interfering with the assignee's interest, for

reasons other than those contemplated by the
terms of the underlying obligation. First
Security had such notice through the financial
statement submitted to its attorneys.
Accordingly, we reverse in part and affirm in
part, and remand to the trial court for entry of
an appropriate judgment in favor of 4447
Associates in accordance with this opinion.
BILLINGS and WILKINS, JJ., concur.
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